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IS “CRAIG’S CONTENTIOUS SUGGESTION”
REALLY SO IMPLAUSIBLE?
William Lane Craig

Raymond Van Arragon considers my my suggestion that most of those who
never have the opportunity to accept Christ during their earthly lives suffer
from transworld damnation, and he offers four different interpretations of
that notion. He argues that at least three of these interpretations are such
that on them the suggestion becomes implausible. I maintain that once my
suggestion is properly understood, then, despite Van Arragon’s misgivings,
it ought not to be thought implausible even on the first two, boldest interpretations he offers.

In a discussion of my proposed Molinist solution to the soteriological
problem of evil, Raymond Van Arragon weighs four different interpretations of so-called transworld damnation and argues that at least three of
them are such that on them the proposed solution becomes implausible.1 I
hope to show, on the contrary, that the first two interpretations he assesses
ought not to be thought implausible in light of his arguments, so that further refinements become moot.
Van Arragon focuses on what he calls Craig’s Contentious Suggestion:
It is plausible to suppose that (a) most of those who do not accept
Christ during their earthly lives suffer from transworld damnation,
and (b) the fact that a person suffers from transworld damnation
ensures that it is fair that he ends up in hell, even if he never hears the
Gospel message.
I actually suggested more modestly that it is plausible that (a) most of
those who never have the opportunity to accept Christ during their earthly
lives suffer from transworld damnation; but I suppose that such a suggestion would strike Van Arragon as scarcely less contentious. I also argued
with respect to (b) that the reason the unevangelized are largely justly condemned is not so much because they would freely repudiate God’s salvation no matter which circumstances they were in but because they do reject
God’s saving grace in their actual circumstances. Clause (b) of Craig’s
Contentious Suggestion does not come into play, however, in the two
interpretations we shall consider, so that we may leave it aside and focus
our attention on clause (a).
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The truth of Craig’s Contentious Suggestion, explains Van Arragon,
depends upon the interpretation of trans-world damnation. He accordingly distinguishes between
TDF.

The property of being such that in every feasible world in
which one exists, one does not freely accept Christ

and
TDS.

The property of being such that, for every situation in which
one’s essence might be instantiated and one left free with
respect to accepting Christ, one would in fact freely not
accept Christ in that situation.

Van Arragon is correct in distinguishing these two interpretations, and, as I
explained in my exchange with David Hunt on this problem, it was TDS
which I had intended to suggest.2
Now Van Arragon declines to evaluate Craig’s Contentious Suggestion
on the TDS interpretation per se. Rather he hopes to show that the suggestion is false on the weaker TDF interpretation; a fortiori it will also be false
on the more radical TDS interpretation. His strategy is to show that clause
(a) of Craig’s Contentious Suggestion is implausible, so that the Suggestion
as a whole is false.
Van Arragon essays to show (1) that a situation can strongly incline a
person to accept Christ without compromising his ability to do so freely,
and (2) that in the set of feasible worlds, for any person there will likely be
many persuasive situations in which that person is free to accept the offer
of salvation during his earthly life. We may forego an exposition of Van
Arragon’s arguments for (1) and (2), since the Molinist has no interest in
denying either of these rather obvious truths.
So how is the truth of (1) and (2) supposed to be problematic for clause
(a) of Craig’s Contentious Suggestion on the TDF interpretation? Van
Arragon answers, “It seems clear to me, given these conclusions, that it is
prima facie plausible to think that TDF is a rare property—it is prima facie
plausible to think that of the people God created, relatively few suffer from
it.”3 But this inference is far too hasty. When Van Arragon asserts that
TDF is a rare property, one might at first think that he means rare with
respect to persons in worlds feasible for God. Given all the persuasive situations in which a person might find himself, there will be far more people
whom God could have created who in some world or other freely accept
Christ and are saved than who reject Christ in every feasible world in
which they exist. But that cannot be Van Arragon’s meaning, for given the
limitless number of feasible worlds available to God and the limitless number of people in them, it makes no sense to speak of rarity with respect to
such people or worlds. Just as there is a one-to-one correspondence
between the set of the natural numbers and the proper subset of the prime
numbers, so there is a one-to-one correspondence between the set of all
persons in feasible worlds and the proper subset of all persons in feasible
worlds who are transworldly damned. Moreover, the question would
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really concern the compossibility of persons exhibiting TDF, and while feasible words in which all or most all of the unevangelized are transworldly
damned might be thought to be “rare” (perhaps in the sense that a randomly thrown dart at a logical space of randomly ordered feasible worlds
would likely strike a world in which all the unevangelized are not
transworldly damned), that does nothing to preclude God from having
chosen one of them to be actual—in which case the rarity of TDF does
nothing to imply the second part of Van Arragon’s above-cited statement
that relatively few people do, in fact, suffer from it.
What Van Arragon means, then, in affirming that it is prima facie plausible that TDF is a rare property, is that it is rare in the actual world. Thus the
second half of his statement quoted above merely reiterates in different
words or explicates the initial assertion that TDF is a rare property. But
then his initial assertion seems to be a non-sequitur. For whether TDF is in
fact rare will depend entirely on which world is actual, and, as already suggested, God may have had good reasons to actualize a world which might
strike us as unusual or exotic. Van Arragon seems to think that on the proposed solution it is just an accident that almost all the unevangelized are
transworldly damned, that it just happens to be like that, which is enormously implausible. But on the Molinist view this situation is the result of
God’s sovereign choice: He has elected to actualize a world in which the
unevangelized who are damned are transworldly damned. The heavy
emphasis here falls upon God’s sovereign choice. Granted that people in
very persuasive circumstances are extremely likely to freely decide for
Christ and that actual persons would find themselves in such circumstances
were various other feasible worlds actual; that does nothing to render it
implausible that God has chosen a world in which all the unevangelized
who are damned would have been damned in every feasible world in
which they exist. One cannot assess even the prima facie plausibility of
clause (a) of Craig’s Contentious Suggestion without taking into account the
Creator’s character, motives, and goals that lay behind His creative decree.
Van Arragon proceeds to examine what he calls common sense considerations concerning the world’s unevangelized in order to confirm the
implausibility of clause (a). He invites us to consider the case of a Native
American Indian living at a time prior to the arrival of European missionaries. Such a person is apt to follow the religions of his community. Is it
plausible, asks Van Arragon, to suppose that he would not freely accept
Christ in any feasible world? Van Arragon replies that, given that such a
person is religious (however misguided), we cannot plausibly suppose that
he suffers from TDF. Moreover, it is utterly implausible that most of his
peers, along with most other religious people who never hear of Christ,
suffer from it. “These considerations reinforce our initial inclination to
think that TDF is a rare property—rare among the uninformed, and hence
rare among those who fail to accept Christ during their earthly lives—and
thus it seems not at all plausible to suppose that most of those who fail to
accept Christ suffer from TDF.”4
In this appeal to common sense considerations I think we see revealed
Van Arragon’s fundamental misunderstanding of my proposal. He seems
to imagine that we can assess the plausibility of an unevangelized person’s
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or persons’ being transworldly damned just by looking at the world, in isolation from any consideration of God’s character, motives, and purposes.
But given the nature of my proposal, such a procedure is impossible. For
the proposal is that God, in His love, is too good to create persons who are
lost through the historical accident of not being presented with the Gospel
(I Tim. 2.4; II Pet. 3.9); therefore, utilizing His middle knowledge, He has
chosen to create a world in which everyone who would respond to the
Gospel if he heard it is born at a time and place in history where he does
hear it. So whether the suggestion of clause (a) is plausible depends fundamentally upon the character, motives, and purposes of God. The Molinist
solution I propose is one which is worthy of God: it is the sort of thing that
He both could and would do. So why think that it is implausible that He
has created such a world as the solution envisions?
The best face that we can put on Van Arragon’s objection is that there is
some empirically manifest property, for example, religiosity, which only
non-transworldly damned people exhibit and that many of the unevangelized have this property. But this suggestion strikes me as wholly implausible. There is no reason to think that there is such an empirically manifest
property, least of all that it is religiosity. For the actual world may be the
world in which many of the unevangelized come the closest to embracing
general revelation and being saved. Some may come within a hair’s
breadth of salvation in the actual world. We have no reason to think that
in other worlds feasible for God they do accept God’s offer of salvation.
Furthermore, and more fundamentally, it is precisely the unevangelized’s
religiosity which prevents their embracing God’s revelation and so damns
them. The person who is truly open to God will respond to His general
revelation in nature and conscience and so be saved through Christ’s atoning death, even though he has no explicit knowledge of Christ. The persons with whom we are concerned are those who, however religious and
upstanding, have failed to respond to the saving overtures of the true God.
Trusting in religion rather than in God to save them, they are of all men
most deluded. For such persons their religiosity is a positive impediment
to their being saved, a sign not of their openness to God, but of their substituting some surrogate for God; for otherwise they would be saved, which
ex hypothesi they are not.
Van Arragon offers no independent objection to the plausibility of
clause (a) when construed in terms of TDS. Since this is the stronger interpretation, the plausibility of TDF does not go to establish the plausibility of
TDS. But given the existence of an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and
omniscient God endowed with middle knowledge, I see no reason to think
it implausible that He in His providence has elected to create a world such
as is described in Craig’s Contentious Suggestion.
Talbot School of Theology
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